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Abstract Cultural evolution studies are characterized by the notion that culture
evolves accordingly to broadly Darwinian principles. Yet how far the analogy be-
tween cultural and genetic evolution should be pushed is open to debate. Here, we
examine a recent disagreement that concerns the extent to which cultural trans-
mission should be considered a preservative mechanism allowing selection among
different variants, or a transformative process in which individuals recreate variants
each time they are transmitted. The latter is associated with the notion of ‘‘cultural
attraction’’. This issue has generated much misunderstanding and confusion. We
first clarify the respective positions, noting that there is in fact no substantive
incompatibility between cultural attraction and standard cultural evolution ap-
proaches, beyond a difference in focus. Whether cultural transmission should be
considered a preservative or reconstructive process is ultimately an empirical
question, and we examine how both preservative and reconstructive cultural
transmission has been studied in recent experimental research in cultural evolution.
Finally, we discuss how the relative importance of preservative and reconstructive
processes may depend on the granularity of analysis and the domain being studied.
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Introduction
Cultural evolution is a vibrant, interdisciplinary, and increasingly productive
scientific framework that aims to provide a naturalistic and quantitative explanation
of culture, in both human and non-human species (Mesoudi 2011; Richerson and
Christiansen 2013). ‘Culture’ is commonly defined as the body of information that is
transmitted from individual to individual via social learning (rather than genetically),
and colloquially includes such phenomena as attitudes, beliefs, knowledge, skills,
customs and institutions. Inspired by pre-existing population genetics tools, the
mathematical models of cultural dynamics developed by Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985) first established that cultural
change can be modelled as an evolutionary process yet one that is not slavishly
identical in its details to genetic evolution. Today, while maintaining a solid
modelling core (e.g. Kendal et al. 2009; Rendell et al. 2010; Aoki et al. 2011; Lewis
and Laland 2012; Aoki et al. 2012; Kempe et al. 2014), a wide range of
methodologies are used in the field of cultural evolution, including phylogenetic
analysis (e.g. Gray and Jordan 2000; Tehrani and Collard 2002; Lycett 2009; Currie
et al. 2010; Tehrani 2013; O’Brien et al. 2014), laboratory experiments (e.g. Mesoudi
et al. 2006; Caldwell and Millen 2008; Mesoudi and O’Brien 2008; Kirby et al. 2008;
Morgan et al. 2012; Derex et al. 2013; Muthukrishna et al. 2014; Tamariz et al.
2014), ethnographic field studies (e.g. Guglielmino et al. 1995; Henrich and Henrich
2010; Mathew and Boyd 2011; Hewlett et al. 2011; Demps et al. 2012; Kline et al.
2013), quantitative analysis of pre-historical, historical, and contemporary datasets
(e.g. Shennan and Wilkinson 2001; Henrich 2001; Kline and Boyd 2010; Collard
et al. 2011; Turchin et al. 2013; Acerbi and Bentley 2014; Beheim et al. 2014), and
comparative studies of culture across species (Whiten et al. 1999; Laland et al. 2011;
Dean et al. 2012). Although varied in methodology and topic, these studies are united
by the notion that culture evolves according to broadly Darwinian principles.
In parallel with this approach, a group of cognitive anthropologists have
advanced a similar project aiming towards naturalistic explanations of culture,
mainly focusing on the role that cognitive factors play in the transmission and
transformation of cultural representations (Sperber 1996; Atran 1998; Boyer 2001;
Sperber and Hirschfeld 2004). This approach has generated findings using
laboratory experiments (e.g. Boyer and Ramble 2001; Barrett and Nyhof 2001;
Norenzayan et al. 2006; Fessler et al. 2014) and analyses of historical (e.g. Nichols
2002; Norenzayan et al. 2006; Morin 2013) and cross-cultural (e.g. Atran 1998)
datasets. The two approaches initially developed separately and, despite a series of
attempts at seeking common ground (Henrich and Boyd 2002; Claidie`re and
Sperber 2007; Sperber and Claidie`re 2008; Henrich et al. 2008), there is remaining
disagreement (see e.g. Claidie`re et al. 2014).
This disagreement rests, at a general level, in a different view of cultural
transmission. For the standard cultural evolution approach, typified by Boyd,
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Richerson, Henrich and others, it is common to think of cultural evolution as a
process of selection between different variants (e.g. beliefs, ideas or artefacts) or
models (referring to people from whom one can copy). When deciding a name for a
newborn, for example, one chooses from a pool of variants—the existing names in
the population—and the individual-level processes of selection determine the
success, at the population-level, of the variants. Cultural transmission has relatively
high fidelity, and selection between faithfully transmitted variants plays an
important role in determining cultural trajectories.
Sperber, Claidie`re, Atran, Boyer and colleagues, instead, argue that in the vast
majority of cases cultural traits are neither properly copied or selected, but
reconstructed each time an instance of transmission happens. The permanence of
some cultural traits occurs not due to high fidelity cultural transmission but instead
due to the existence of stable ‘‘cultural attractors’’ (Sperber 1996). For example, in
an oral transmission of a story, say Cinderella, it is highly unlikely the story will be
repeated verbatim at each passage. Still, some defining features, say the pumpkin
coach or the wicked stepmother, perhaps because they are particularly memorable,
will act as attractors, and will be repeated (‘reconstructed’) each time by different
narrators. Cultural transmission here has relatively low fidelity, and non-random
distortions and reconstructions play an important role in maintaining cultural
diversity and stability.
This general divergence has a series of consequences, ranging from what are
considered the most important or interesting factors to take into account when
explaining the permanence and diffusion of cultural traits (cognitive transformation
of representations for Sperber and colleagues, interaction of simple decision-making
biases with populational dynamics for the standard cultural evolution approach) to
how far the analogy between cultural and biological evolution should be pushed
(less for the former than for the latter approach).
In our view, there is no real conflict between the two approaches, besides a focus
on different aspects of cultural evolution. Yet much confusion and disagreement
seems to surround these issues, despite occasional claims of reconciliation and
compatibility. The aim of this paper is to clarify the two positions, identifying areas
of common ground and genuine disagreement, and suggest how cultural evolution
research should best proceed.
In the following sections, we will first outline the basic tenets of the two
approaches, and then move to defend the usefulness of a narrow notion of cultural
attraction, as opposed to the broader notion proposed by Sperber and colleagues
(e.g. Sperber 1996; Claidie`re et al. 2014), that we define as extended. The narrow
notion is applied when cultural transmission is a mainly reconstructive process (as
in the Cinderella example), and is contrasted with cases in which cultural
transmission is a mainly preservative process and preferential selection is the most
important driver of cultural dynamics (as in the baby names example). We will
discuss how narrow attraction and preferential selection are better viewed as two
extremes of a continuum (see also El Mouden et al. 2014) in which the relative
importance of preservative and reconstructive processes is ultimately an empirical
question, varying in different cultural domains, and depending on the granularity of
the analysis. Finally, one weakness of current debates is the reliance on fictional
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thought experiments of unclear real-world relevance, or formal models with
assumptions that can be manipulated to support either position. We therefore discuss
actual empirical examples in which attraction has been considered, drawing on the
now-vast cultural evolution literature.
Two approaches for explaining culture
The standard cultural evolution approach
The notion that human culture ‘evolves’ in a manner similar to the way in which
species evolve has a long history. Darwin (1871) himself, in the Descent of Man,
drew on the work of historical linguists who were already constructing informal
evolutionary trees of language families (see van Whine 2005). Although the idea of
cultural evolution sporadically emerged during the early to mid 20th century, such as
in the work of psychologist Donald Campbell (e.g. Campbell 1965), it was not until
the 1970s and 1980s that a quantitative science of cultural evolution was established,
primarily by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985).
These researchers began with classic models of population genetics developed within
evolutionary biology in the early 20th century by Fisher, Haldane, Wright and others.
Population genetic models are essentially mathematical formalisations of the
evolutionary process outlined by Darwin, with added assumptions about genetic
inheritance, genetic mutation and the like that subsequent experimentalists added to
Darwin’s basic theory. They provide a way of exploring how the events in the lives of
individuals—survival, reproduction, the rules of inheritance, etc.—scale up over
successive generations and in large populations. Mathematical formalism proved far
superior to verbal descriptions, and population genetic models resolved all manner of
confusion over issues such as how particulate inheritance of discrete units (genes)
could be reconciled with the apparent blending of continuous traits, and how natural
selection can yield significant evolutionary change without any kind of Lamarckian
transformation (see Mesoudi 2011, pp. 47–51).
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985) aimed to do
the same for culture: to adapt population genetic models to be suitable for cultural
change (see Mesoudi 2011, Ch 3 for an accessible overview of this work). These
models made assumptions about the lives of individuals—who they learn from, who
they pass cultural traits onto, the rules of cultural inheritance etc.—and then explore
the long-term, population-level consequences of these events over many generations
and in large, often structured populations. While they adopted the same
mathematical tools as used in biology, they were careful not to import assumptions
regarding genetic evolution that are unlikely to apply to cultural evolution. For
example, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) modelled the consequences of not just
vertical cultural transmission (learning from biological parents) but also oblique
cultural transmission (learning from unrelated members of the parental generation)
and horizontal cultural transmission (learning from peers), as well as specific forms
of the latter such as one-to-many transmission (typical of mass media). Boyd and
Richerson (1985) modelled conformist cultural transmission (preferentially
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adopting the majority behaviour in the population) and model-based cultural
transmission (preferentially learning from particularly high status or prestigious
individuals), which again have no clear parallel in biological evolution. Boyd and
Richerson (1985) also explored the conditions under which cultural transmission
biases such as conformity might be favoured by genetic evolution and the two-way
interaction between genetic and cultural evolution, or what is known as gene-culture
coevolution (or dual-inheritance).
Of most relevance to the present paper are Boyd and Richerson’s (1985) models of
‘guided variation’ and ‘direct’ (or ‘content’) bias. Guided variation occurs when
individuals transform cultural variants in a non-random (perhaps genetically adaptive)
direction due to trial and error learning or some higher-level cognitive inductive
process, and then pass on this modified trait to others in an unbiased (random) manner.
The cause of change here lies within the individual, rather than with any populational
process of selection between different variants or different people (because transmis-
sion is unbiased). Boyd and Richerson (1985) show, as one would intuitively expect,
that if everyone transforms traits in the same direction, then the population quickly
converges on this individually-favoured trait. Note that there is nothing like selection
going on in this model. Indeed, it could instead be described as a form of Lamarckism,
with evolutionary change driven by non-random modifications made by individuals.
Guided variation can be contrasted with direct bias (Boyd and Richerson 1985;
later renamed ‘content bias’ in Richerson and Boyd 2005), where individuals survey
all traits in the population, individually evaluate them (based, for example, on
whether they are more effective or efficient than existing traits, or whether they fit
with pre-existing cognitive biases), and preferentially adopt certain traits over other
traits. Unlike guided variation, content bias is selection-like, because it does not
itself change or transform the trait in any way, it just changes the trait’s frequency in
the population. Hence the strength of content bias (like the strength of natural
selection) depends on the amount of variation that is in the population. Guided
variation, in contrast, works irrespective of variation in the population. The
aforementioned model-based and conformist biases are similar to content bias in
being selection-like, i.e. particular traits (e.g. those held by successful or prestigious
individuals, or those exhibited by the majority) are preferentially adopted, with no
change to those traits themselves other than their frequency. Note that Boyd and
Richerson (1985) themselves, in that and subsequent work, have been reluctant to
label the latter processes as ‘cultural selection’ preferring the term ‘biased
transmission’ (e.g. Richerson and Boyd 2005, p. 69). Following Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman (1981) and Mesoudi (2011) we nevertheless treat these as equivalent to
cultural selection, given that they involve the selection of particular traits over
others with no modification of those traits. Guided variation, however, is
unambiguously non-selection-like, a point we return to later.
Sperberian cultural attraction
In parallel with the development of the standard cultural evolutionary approach,
Dan Sperber and a group of cognitive anthropologists and psychologists developed a
program of naturalistic explanation of cultural phenomena mainly aimed, at least
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initially, at recognizing the importance of universal cognitive factors in shaping
cultural differences and regularities (Sperber 1996; Sperber and Hirschfeld 2004). In
contrast to mainstream socio-cultural anthropology, which in recent decades has
largely shied away from cross-cultural comparisons, Sperber and collaborators
emphasised the existence of trans-cultural regularities in domains such as religion
(Boyer 2001), social classification (Hirschfeld 1998), and folk-biology (the way in
which people reason about plants and animal: Atran 1998).
The explanation for these regularities can be found in how representations
interact with universal cognitive constraints. Again in contrast to the majority of
socio-cultural anthropology, this approach endorsed a vision of cognitive architec-
ture in which cognition is endowed with a rich, genetically-determined structure,
that influences cultural processes in a meaningful way. In particular, Sperber
defended what is known as the massive modularity hypothesis (Sperber 1996), that
is, the idea that the mind is composed of a multitude of information-processing
mechanisms that operate autonomously or quasi-autonomously on specific domains
(Carruthers 2006). In this way, Sperber and colleagues’ approach can be aligned to
Tooby and Cosmides’ brand of evolutionary psychology (Tooby and Cosmides
1992; Pinker 2010), which similarly advocates the existence of domain-specific,
pan-human, cognitive modules that evoke similar behaviours in response to similar
environmental cues.
In the case of religion (Boyer 2001), for example, successful supernatural
concepts such as gods or angels are characterised by a combination of (1)
consistency to intuitive, universal expectations—produced by our domain-specific
cognitive architecture—about intentional agents (gods are jealous, they see our
actions, they punish and reward, etc.) and (2) a few relevant violations of those
expectations (gods are immortal and omnipresent, they can read our thoughts, etc.).
This combination makes these minimally counter-intuitive entities easier to recall,
as well as more likely to be spontaneously recreated. This in turn favours the
success and the stability of those cultural systems, like religions—but also folk
tales—in which they are present. Minimally counter-intuitive entities function as
‘‘cultural attractors’’. These predictions have been supported by laboratory
experiments showing that minimally counterintuitive representations are better
remembered and passed on (Barrett and Nyhof 2001; Boyer and Ramble 2001), and
analyses of actual folk tales showing that successful tales contain an optimal number
of counterintuitive elements (Norenzayan et al. 2006).
As part of this theoretical framework, Sperber (1996) challenged the standard
cultural evolution approach, in particular the adequacy of the ‘‘selectionist’’
character of its decision-making biases, and it is this challenge that we focus on in
the present paper. According to Sperber, describing cultural evolution as a process
of selection between different alternatives is quite misleading: cultural traits do not
replicate in the process of transmission, instead they are transformed and
reconstructed each time. A proper process of selection, such as natural selection
as it operates on genetic replicators, needs to be sustained by low rates of mutation
that are simply impossible to achieve in the case of human cultural transmission.
How is it, then, that Cinderella is still here with us? Sperber and colleagues do
not deny the macrostability of culture, that is, the fact that some traditions are
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successfully preserved in time and space, often over many generations. However,
they reject the assumption that this happens because the transmission of traits at the
individual level is highly faithful. Instead, the transformations that occur at each
transmission event are, in the majority of cases, non-random. Amongst all possible
reconstructions of Cinderella, some of them, perhaps the ones featuring a pumpkin
coach or ugly stepsisters, are more likely than others to happen. The idea of a
‘‘cultural attractor’’ rests on the assumption that transformations are not equally
probable, and instead are biased in some direction. If, as Sperber suggests, one
thinks of all possible transformations in a space of possibilities, probabilities will
tend to cluster in some points of this space.
To say that an attractor exists, Sperber adds, is not an explanation for a given
cultural phenomenon, but it is a way ‘‘to suggest the kind of causal explanations to
be sought: namely, the identification of genuine causal factors that bias micro-
transformations’’ (Sperber 1996, p. 112), or ‘‘factors of attraction’’. As noted above,
the factors of attraction identified typically reflect g domain-specific features of
cognition. Consider again Cinderella. The pumpkin coach might be a good example
of a minimally counter-intuitive element, particularly likely to be retained (see
Norenzayan et al. 2006 for an analysis of folk tales, including Cinderella). The
presence of the wicked stepmother, meanwhile, has been argued to have its origins
in kin selection (Daly and Wilson 1999), where child abuse and, in extreme cases,
infanticide are more likely to occur between genetically unrelated people, such as
stepparents and stepchildren. In both of these cases, then, cultural stability arises not
through high-fidelity transmission but because pumpkin coaches and non-kin-
directed child abuse are salient cultural attractors that are particularly likely to be
remembered and reconstructed in successive retellings.
Clarifying ‘cultural attraction’
More recently, the idea of cultural attraction has been reassessed by Claidie`re et al.
(2014). First, they emphasise that factors of attraction are not exclusively cognitive.
While this has been clearly specified from Sperber’s initial presentation (factors of
attraction were classified as ‘psychological’ and ‘ecological’ in Sperber 1996), the
existence of non-cognitive factors of attraction is often overlooked, and attractors
are usually labelled ‘‘cognitive attractors’’ (see e.g. Henrich et al. 2008). This
confusion may have arisen because cultural attraction advocates themselves
sometimes suggest this interpretation. For example, Claidie`re and Sperber (2007)
write, ‘‘the idea of attraction […] aims at explaining the relative prevalence and
stability of cultural content as a function of properties of the content themselves’’ (p.
91, our italics). However, Claidie`re et al. (2014) make it clear that factors of
attraction encompass everything that creates attractors in the space of possibilities of
transformations. Given that this has generated confusion in the literature, we think it
is worth clearly pointing it out here.
Second, and potentially more significantly, Claidie`re et al. (2014) clarify how
attraction encompasses all instances of cultural change (see also Sperber 1996).
Because factors of attraction encompass everything that creates attractors in the
space of possibilities of transformations, Claidie`re et al. (2014) therefore argue that
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this also includes perfect replication, which supports selection processes. Selection
is therefore considered a special case of attraction. The consequence of this
interpretation is that ‘‘attraction’’ is synonymous with any directional change in
cultural evolution, whether due to transformations of cultural traits during
transmission or not. Processes like content bias, conformity, or prestige-based bias,
which are usually seen as distinct from attraction (Henrich et al. 2008), are
considered by Claidie`re et al. (2014) to be examples of attraction. Again, much
confusion surrounds this issue. In the same paper it is written, for example, that ‘‘the
constructive processes we discussed above may tend to transform different inputs in
similar ways (rather than randomly), and in doing so cause the outputs to
tendentially converge upon particular types, called attractors. This tendency is called
cultural attraction’’ (Claidie`re et al. 2014, our italics). Elsewhere, Claidie`re and
Sperber (2007) explicitly talk of two ‘‘kinds of phenomena—distribution-based
transmission biases and content-based attraction’’ (p. 91). The example used by
Claidie`re and Sperber (2007) is smoking: initially naı¨ve individuals copy the
smoking rate of a light smoker (selection), and then independently transform this
number towards one of two attractors, either zero cigarettes or 25 cigarettes
(attraction). Selection and attraction are clearly separate and different processes, as
we have presented them in the previous section.
However, from the examples included in Claidie`re et al. (2014), it appears that all
directional processes of cultural evolution would fall under the general umbrella of
‘attraction’ (possibly excluding cultural drift, a process analogous to genetic drift in
which the success of cultural traits is simply due to chance, as some traits are
observed, or transmitted, more than others for random reasons - see Bentley et al.
2004). We therefore call this the extended concept of attraction, which encompasses
any directional (non-random) cultural change. We contrast this with a narrow
concept of attraction, which refers only to the transformative, non-selective
processes in cultural transmission, and which seems closer to Claidie`re and
Sperber’s (2007) definition, when they explicitly model the relative strength of
selection and attraction in cultural transmission. In the rest of our paper we restrict
cultural attraction to the narrow sense, because this seems to capture the genuine
theoretical disagreement: the extent to which cultural evolution is influenced by
individual transformation or by selection-like processes.
We note first, however, that the extended concept of cultural attraction seems
little different to the notion of cultural evolution presented by Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman (1981); Boyd and Richerson (1985), and others, as discussed above.
Claidie`re et al. (2014) extended notion of attraction incorporates reconstructive,
transformative processes (which we call narrow attraction), as well as selection-like
model-based, frequency-dependent and content-based biases that rest on higher
fidelity cultural transmission. Cultural evolution as presented by Boyd and
Richerson (1985), too, contains the transformative process of guided variation,
which in our view seems identical to narrow attraction, as well as selection-like
model-based and content-based biases, as described in Sect. 2.1 above. If extended
cultural attraction is nothing more than cultural evolution, then we see little need to
adopt extended cultural attraction as a concept, because these processes have
already been modelled and extensively studied under the name ‘cultural evolution’.
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Modelling (narrow) attraction and selection
Henrich and Boyd (2002) used a mathematical model to show that, when both
selection and attraction are present, the outcomes of the process are determined by
selection alone. A verbal description of the model is as follows (see also Henrich
et al. 2008): consider a continuous mental representation, for example, concerning
what governs the moon’s behaviour. At one extreme (attractor-0) the moon is
considered an intentional agent, and its behaviour can be explained using folk
psychology (the moon wants to hide under the horizon, it changes shape to
communicate something to us, etc.). At the other extreme (attractor-1) the moon is
simply considered to be a ‘‘big rock’’, lacking motivations and goals, and physical
laws such as gravitation determine its behaviour. Ideas between the two attractors
are possible (one can think that the movement of the moon is determined by
gravitation, but the shape is related to the moon’s emotions), but, as the two
extremes are more internally coherent, transformation of the representations will not
be equiprobable, and will tend towards one or the other attractor. This is (narrow)
cultural attraction.
Now for selection: imagine that individuals with a mental representation close to
attractor-1 are more successful, or simply more visible or vocal about their ideas
than individuals with a mental representation close to attractor-0. This might be
because, say, attractor-1 is the scientific explanation that is deemed correct in a
particular society. Therefore, when individuals pick a model from whom to copy,
there is a higher probability that they will select one closer to attractor-1.
It should be clear from this description that there is only one possible outcome of
the model, and that, irrespective of the influence of attractor-0, the entire population
will converge on attractor-1. Imagine that the attractors have the same influence:
individuals who copy models who are closer to attractor-0 will move, because
transmission is imperfect, even closer to attractor 0, and likewise individuals
copying models closer to attractor-1 will move closer to attractor-1. However, any
selective force, however weak, favouring a tendency to copy models closer to
attractor-1 will bring the population to that equilibrium. Even when attractor-0 (the
non-selected one) is disproportionally stronger in terms of cultural attraction than
attractor-1, as long as at least one individual is in the ‘‘area of influence’’ of the
latter, the population will converge to attractor-1. In other words, selection trumps
attraction.
The conclusion of the model is, therefore, that when both selection and attraction
are present, the system can still be described by standard discrete replicator
dynamics, and selection will always determine the result, no matter how strong is
attraction (actually, the stronger attraction is, the better the approximation with
replicator dynamics) and no matter how strong is the non-selected attractor.
Claidie`re and Sperber (2007) criticised Henrich and Boyd’s model, noting that it
rests on some problematic assumptions, two of them of primary importance. The
first is that the target of selection coincides with one of the attractors. Imagine
instead that in a particular society, ‘‘mixed’’ theories of moon behaviour are
particularly praised and are favoured by selection, while the pure-scientific and the
pure-intentional are still the attractors. What will happen in this situation? In this
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case, the outcome will be determined by selection and attraction. Depending on
where the selective peak is in the attractors’ areas of influence, the population will
converge on one of the two attractors. If the selective peak is in the area of influence
of attractor-1 the population will converge to attractor-1 (not to the selective peak),
and the same for attractor-0.
Second, Claidie`re and Sperber (2007) point out that attractors in Henrich and
Boyd (2002) model are deterministic. Individuals will end up, no matter what, in an
attractor once they are in its area of influence, and this is the reason why non-
preservative cultural transmission can be reduced to replicator dynamics. In
contrast, they present a notion of probabilistic attraction, for which, depending on
the force of attractors, individuals can actually escape from their influence (a weak
attractor in Henrich and Boyd (2002) model is just an attractor that requires a longer
time for the population in its area of influence to converge). While probabilistic
attraction basically entails adding noise to the original model, it shows that, in this
more realistic situation, the relative strength of attraction and selection are important
for the outcomes, and both can contribute to cultural evolutionary dynamics.
While the models hint at some interesting questions that could be explored
experimentally (e.g. how likely is selection to coincide with attraction in real life
dynamics? How noisy is transformation in cultural transmission?), this exchange
shows that it is difficult, using thought experiments or modelling alone, to settle the
question. The argument from Claidie`re and Sperber (2007), which suggests a
variable role of attraction and selection in determining the outcome of cultural
evolution, seems intuitively more convincing. However, the role of preservative and
reconstructive processes in cultural transmission is ultimately an empirical question.
In the next sections we will thus first examine how reconstructive cultural
transmission has been studied in recent experimental research in cultural evolution.
Then, we will discuss how the relative importance of preservative and reconstruc-
tive processes may depend on the granularity of the analysis (i.e. on what one
considers as the unit of analysis, a ‘‘cultural trait’’) and how it varies in different
domains.
Empirical evidence relating to the study of preservative
and transformative processes
Experimental studies of cultural transmission
Even though transformation is most commonly associated with the cultural
attraction approach, transformation is actually a common subject of study within the
standard cultural evolution literature. For example, Mesoudi and Whiten (2004)
examined the transformation of event knowledge (descriptions of everyday events
such as going to a restaurant) as it is passed along chains of participants each of
whom receives the previous participants’ recall as their input. In line with schema
theories from cognitive psychology, it was found that low-level actions (e.g. ‘he
opened the door, took a seat at the table) were spontaneously subsumed into
medium-level (e.g. ‘he entered the restaurant) and high-level (e.g. ‘he went to a
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restaurant) goals, despite the latter being absent from the original description. The
driver of change here is clearly individual modification, which occurred similarly
and independently in all participants based on previously acquired and common
knowledge structures. While not described as (narrow) cultural attraction in the
paper, it is clearly an example of it.
In the same way, although they do not use the term ‘cultural attraction’,
experiments and models in the Bayesian inductive reasoning or iterated learning
tradition (Kirby et al. 2007; Griffiths et al. 2008) also appear to capture the kind of
change envisioned by cultural attraction proponents. For example, Xu et al. (2013)
experimentally simulated changes in colour labels, noted by Claidie`re et al. (2014)
to be potentially constrained by psychophysical aspects of cognition that may form a
cultural attractor. Xu et al. had participants learn to pair novel words with specific
colour shades. While the first participant learned random word-colour pairings,
subsequent participants were trained in the word-colour pairs produced by a
previous participant, along chains of 13 cultural ‘generations’. Each participant
made non-random changes such that the fictional terms gradually converged on real-
life colour term clusters. Similar iterated learning experiments have shown that
properties of languages, such as compositionality, spontaneously emerge as
participants individually modify artificial languages to make them more learnable
(Kirby et al. 2008). The source of change in all these cases lies in individual
participants’ cognition and perception, which act in similar ways across people to
drive cultural representations towards similar end-points, in line with the notion of
cultural attraction.
Other studies have combined guided variation and selection-like biased
transmission. Bettinger and Eerkens (1999) found that different patterns of
prehistoric arrowhead variation in North America showed signatures of different
mechanisms of cultural transmission. Arrowheads from Nevada showed little
variation, coming in a small number of uniform types. Contemporary arrowheads
from California showed extensive variation, with no uniform types. Bettinger and
Eerkens (1999) argued that the former pattern was generated via model-based
biases, with prehistoric hunters preferentially copying the arrowhead designs of
successful or prestigious hunters, thus creating a small number of popular types. The
more diverse Californian arrowheads, on the other hand, were influenced by guided
variation, as each arrowhead maker modified their design according to trial-and-
error. Mesoudi and O’Brien (2008) subsequently experimentally simulated these
hypothesised transmission processes, confirming that model-based bias and guided
variation can, under certain circumstances, generate the observed patterns of low
and high variation respectively. This general hypothesis is noteworthy because the
individual modification component is not a result of common content-based
cognitive biases, but instead due to contentless trial-and-error (associative) learning.
In the only experimental study that we know of that has explicitly compared
cultural attraction and selection, Eriksson and Coultas (2014) examined the
transmission of stories that invoke to varying degrees emotional reactions of disgust.
In one experiment they passed stories along chains of participants in the standard
manner, finding that elements rated highly disgusting were preserved over elements
rated low in disgust. This can be seen as a form of cultural attraction, with the
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stories mutating at each step in a non-random direction to contain relatively more
disgusting content. In a further experiment, Eriksson and Coultas (2014) allowed
participants to choose whether to read, and then whether to pass on, a story to a
subsequent participant, without altering the story. Hence this resembles selection
(specifically, content/direct bias), because the stories change in frequency without
being altered. Both methods revealed a bias towards disgusting content, indicating
that disgust bias operates both through the non-random transformation of content as
it is remembered and reconstructed, and also the non-random selection of content as
it is chosen and replicated. Although Erikkson and Coultas did not discuss this, it
appears that selection had a larger effect, in that low-disgust material was entirely
absent at the end of the chains in the experiment in which only selection was
possible, whereas in the experiment in which only transformation was possible, low-
disgust material was still present at the end. In explaining the real-life preponder-
ance of disgusting urban legends (see Heath et al. 2001), both cultural attraction and
cultural selection can potentially be seen to be working together.
Here are some take-home messages from these studies. First, cultural attraction,
transformation and cognition are not ignored in standard cultural evolution research.
Many studies, in particular transmission chain studies, have explicitly examined
transformative processes. If anything, it is rarer to find transmission chain studies
that examine cultural selection. Second, few studies have explicitly studied both
selection and attraction. Eriksson and Coultas (2014) is a rare exception. Third,
studies such as Mesoudi and O’Brien (2008) highlight that cultural attraction does
not have to be due to cognitive universals. The individual modification that occurs
in cultural attraction can occur via individual trial-and-error. If a task has multiple
solutions, then perhaps trial-and-error will lead different people to different
solutions (as it did in Mesoudi and O’Brien’s study), such that cultural attraction can
generate and maintain cultural diversity.
Preservative versus reconstructive processes depend on the granularity
of the analysis
In some cultural evolution studies, the unit of analysis is the cultural trait, that is,
what is transmitted in the cultural transmission process. Examples of cultural traits
include names, fairy tales, ways to tie a knot, recipes for lasagne, hammers, and the
like. In others, the unit of analysis is the individual person (see also El Mouden et al.
2014). If each individual has exactly one cultural variant of a particular type, then
these units will coincide. However, where individuals can possess multiple cultural
traits, then classifying cultural change as attraction or selection-like becomes
complicated. Image that person A has ideas X, Y, and Z, and person B learns from A
only ideas X and Y, with no modification of those traits. From the trait-as-unit-of-
analysis perspective, transmission is preservative: traits X and Y are being selected
and transmitted with high fidelity, while trait Z has been selected against. From the
individual-as-unit-of-analysis perspective, however, transmission may be consid-
ered reconstructive, as person B has a different set of traits (XY) compared to
person A (XYZ), from whom she copied.
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Take, for example, a transmission chain experiment by Mesoudi et al. (2006), in
which multiple stories varying in their social complexity were passed along chains
of participants. Over successive transmission episodes, the social stories remained
largely intact, while the non-social stories virtually disappeared. If one takes the
individual as the unit of analysis, then this appears to be a case of cultural attraction.
The first people in the chains had a mixture of social and non-social stories, the final
people had mostly social, such that there is a non-random transformation due to
(according to Mesoudi et al.) biologically evolved and universal aspects of
cognition (humans’ ‘social brains’). If instead one considers each separate story as a
‘trait’, then the process seems more selection-like. The social stories were more
likely to be preserved, and the non-social stories less likely to be preserved, with no
modification to the traits (there was little distortion or confabulation in this
particular study). This change in trait frequency therefore resembles selection. Note
that there is no explicit, conscious ‘selection’ of stories by the participants here, just
unconscious selection as a result of (probably implicit) memory biases; the
population level consequences of both explicit/intended and implicit/unintended
selection will be the same, however. In sum, there doesn’t seem to be a ‘correct’
answer to whether people or traits are the unit of analysis, but which decision we
take determines whether the process is transformative (attraction-like) or preser-
vative (selection-like).
The issue regarding preservation and transformation in transmission, however, is
generally considered assuming the trait-as-unit-of-analysis perspective. Consider
again Cinderella. We used it above as an evident case of reconstructive cultural
transmission since, each time one retells the story, it will be extremely unlikely that
she will repeat exactly the version heard. However, what are we considering here as
the cultural trait? A coarse-grained description of the cultural trait is ‘‘a story
involving a young lady, first oppressed by her stepmother and stepsisters, and then
succeeding in marrying a prince’’. Because this basic plot structure is likely to be
maintained through successive iterations, the transmission is, at this level,
preservative. At an intermediate level we can consider, for example, Cinderella
as a combination of sentences. In this case, assuming that one repeats all the
sentences, one might change some words, saying: ‘‘Once upon a time there lived a
sad young girl’’ instead of ‘‘Once upon a time there lived an unhappy young girl’’.
This would count as reconstructive. Finally, a fine-grained description could focus
on the single words of the story. Imagine one summarises Cinderella in few
sentences, using words picked from the perhaps longer version she heard. One could
interpret this as a preservative process, in which some cultural traits (the words
used) have been selected and reproduced without mutation.
Moreover, cultural selection and cultural attraction are likely, in the majority of
cases, to act together within the same traits, at different levels of generality. As we
mentioned above, supernatural concepts may be favoured because they are
minimally counter-intuitive entities. As an optimal combination of intuitive and
counter-intuitive features, a generic undead being (like a ghost, or a zombie, or a
vampire) is an effective cultural trait. However, an explanation of the cultural
success of a specific undead entity, say, Dracula, needs to include selective
processes. The spreading of Dracula is most likely due both to attraction-related
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factors, that explain why, in general, undead beings are favoured in respect to other
entities, and to selective factors, that explain why, among all other undead beings,
the Transylvanian vampire enjoys such popularity.
One could hope that, when we find the correct unit of analysis for cultural
evolution, we would be able to settle the debate. Unfortunately, this might be
unlikely, as there is continuing disagreement over how to define a cultural trait.
Sperber and Claidie`re (2008) criticize Richerson and Boyd (2005) for seeming to
oscillate between an ‘‘internalist’’ view of cultural traits as ‘‘(mostly) information in
brains’’ (ibidem, p. 61) and an ‘‘externalist’’ one where ‘‘some cultural information
is stored in artifacts’’ (ibidem, p. 61). However, the cultural attraction approach
adopts a similar strategy assuming that both mental representations and behaviours/
artifacts should be considered cultural traits (Sperber and Claidie`re 2008). Claidie`re
et al. (2014), for example, explicitly discuss how mental representations and public
narrations of a folktale should be both treated as cultural traits with ‘‘equally potent
causal roles’’ (ibidem).
One proposed solution to this puzzle is to consider the information, wherever
stored, as the equivalent of the biological genotype, and the expression of the
information in behaviours or artifacts as the equivalent of the biological phenotype
(Dawkins 1976). The problem here is that it assumes that, when copying, we have
access to a ‘‘cultural core’’ (Sperber and Claidie`re 2008), which represents the
information/genotype, which we then use to build variable phenotypic expressions.
This might be loosely the case: the classic example is the transmission of a recipe to
cook, say, lasagne, where the recipe represents the transmitted, stable, genotype, and
what you serve to your guests at dinner is the variable phenotype. However, in many
cases, we do not have access to a ‘‘recipe’’, but we extract the information from the
result/phenotype (such as when we try to reproduce lasagne after tasting it at a
friend’s home). Richerson and Boyd (2005) make a similar point when noting how
the mental representations of different individuals who have tied the same bowline
knot might in principle be very different. What is the genotype here? The individual,
variable, mental representations of the bowline knot cannot be the genotype, as they
are not, in general, transmitted, because they are different. For the same reason, the
information stored in the artifact itself does not transfer directly in the (variable)
mental representations.
Furthermore, even solving the internalist/externalist debate would not settle the
reconstructive/preservative question. Imagine that everybody agreed on an inter-
nalist view, so that the real cultural traits in the transmission of a folktale are the
mental representations, which we could access with some advanced neuroimaging
technique. As we suggested in the Cinderella example, would they be the mental
representations of ‘‘a story involving a young lady, first oppressed by her
stepmother, etc.’’ or more detailed mental representations of the plot, or something
else?
While this may appear pessimistic, we believe that pluralism in the conceptual
definitions of the unit of analysis in cultural evolution is not a problem (see also
Lyman and O’Brien 2003; O’Brien et al. 2010). Biologists, too, work simultane-
ously with multiple concepts of the ‘gene’, varying with context and use (Stotz and
Griffiths 2004). Depending on various domains, and on the questions one is
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interested in, an opportunistic strategy can be the best choice. Moreover, moving
from coarse to fine grained units can indeed clarify how the interplay between
attraction and selection can be important for the success of specific cultural
traditions, as the Dracula example illustrates.
Preservative versus reconstructive processes depend on the empirical
domain
Besides the decision of what to consider a cultural trait, the fidelity of cultural
transmission likely also varies in different empirical domains. We initially
compared two cases. In the oral transmission of stories, we can infer from high
variability of the successive reproduction of the ‘‘same’’ story that reconstructive
processes strongly influence cultural evolution. In first names diffusion, instead, the
innovation rate is extremely low, and cultural transmission is highly preservative,
such that selective processes are more important than attraction-based processes.
Many other examples are possible across the domains of technology, language, art
and social customs.
The general scepticism of proponents of cultural attraction towards the idea that
high fidelity imitation is the unique, or even the main, support for cultural evolution
is a useful counterbalance to a naı¨ve view of humans as perfect and indiscriminate
copy-machines, and that this is enough to explain cultural stability. Not only are
copying mechanisms often characterised by low fidelity (as in the Cinderella
example), but also long-term, stable, traditions are not necessarily supported by high
fidelity copying (as in the religion example, where supernatural concepts may be
reconstructed each time). However, it does not follow from here that copying
mechanisms are always scarcely faithful, or that stable traditions are never
supported by high fidelity copy.
Many technologies that we use are, for example, causally opaque (Csibra and
Gergely 2011), meaning that we do not know or understand the mechanism by
which they produce the result we use them for. Experimental studies have
demonstrated how common high fidelity copying is for technology-related actions.
Flynn and Smith (2012) had adult participants observe a model perform some
operations with a box (using a tool to drag some bolts, tapping with the tool, lifting a
door, inserting a tool into a hole) in order to retrieve a reward from inside. Only the
last two of these actions actually retrieved the reward, the others had no causal
effect in relation to the goal. One group of participants observed the model
interacting with a transparent box and were thus able to see which actions were
unnecessary. For another group the box was opaque, obscuring which actions were
causally relevant. Flynn and Smith (2012) found that adults, like children (Lyons
et al. 2011), showed a high likelihood of copying all actions—both relevant and
irrelevant—under both conditions, even the transparent condition where the
irrelevant actions are revealed to be irrelevant. This phenomenon, dubbed ‘over-
imitation’, indicates that high fidelity copying is often the default approach to
solving unfamiliar problems, even out-weighing causal reasoning. Interestingly,
however, when the model was another participant (rather than the experimenter)
Flynn and Smith (2012) found that participants did not reproduce the unnecessary
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actions when the box was transparent (they still did when the box was opaque). In
other words, when potential sources of prestige are removed (thus removing the
possibility of prestige biased cultural selection), a causally transparent technology
elicited reconstructive transmission, while a causally opaque technology elicited
preservative transmission. More generally, we suspect that the more a technology is
opaque, the more cultural transmission will be preservative; the more a technology
is transparent and model-based biases are absent, the more cultural transmission will
be reconstructive.
Other domains that might be characterised by generally preservative transmission
are domains in which a final result is reached through a sequence of actions, and
sequences of actions that are even slightly different to the correct one produce an
unusable result (Acerbi et al. 2011). Tying a Windsor knot is a serious affair that
involves a sequence of precise actions. Performing correctly, say, nine of the ten
actions required does not produce 90 % of a Windsor knot, but will likely produce a
shapeless configuration of fabric. The task of tying a Windsor knot can be visualised
as a search space with a single slender peak (the correct knot) surrounded by a vast
flat territory (all the action combinations that produce unusable results). For these
tasks, individual learning—or reconstruction—is in general an unsuccessful
strategy, because the final result does not provide any feedback about ‘‘how close’’
one is to the correct solution, nor has genetic evolution provided us with precise
intuitions about knot-tying. Individual learners need to explore each time the full
space of possible actions. The great majority of modern technological tasks
probably fits this description. While constraints that can help individual search and
reconstruction do exist—an airplane has to fly and a kayak has to float—their
guidance is so loose that only preservative cultural transmission can sustain those
traditions (Acerbi et al. 2012). Notice that examples of opaque or slender-peaked
tasks are not necessarily restricted to the technological domain. Other activities that
require performing arbitrary but well-defined sequences of actions, like dancing or
rituals, could in the same way require preservative cultural transmission to persist
(Tennie et al. 2009).
Saying that high fidelity copying is the best strategy in certain situations, or that
some traditions need to be supported by high fidelity copying, does not guarantee, of
course, that this is what happens in reality. We may indeed use suboptimal
strategies, and persistence of traditions can be explained by something else.
However, we have good reasons to believe that, for some domains, this is indeed the
case. Csibra and Gergely (2011) suggest that a suite of species-specific cognitive
adaptations for cultural learning, which they label ‘natural pedagogy’, may be
responsible for the capacity of preservative cultural transmission of opaque
technologies. Natural pedagogy indicates that social learning is accompanied by
ostensive communication, that is, a form of deliberate communication (‘‘Look at
what I am doing with this stick!’’) that guides the learner through the critical aspects
of the process. Similarly, Herrmann et al. (2013) showed that verbally framing a
demonstration stressing the conventionality of the actions involved (as opposed to
their instrumentality) is sufficient to increase imitative fidelity in preschool children.
Others (Tennie et al. 2009) have emphasised how high fidelity in human cultural
transmission can be achieved through a combination of process-oriented imitative
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social learning (humans tend to pay attention not only to the final result of a
demonstration—a Windsor knot—but also to the actions performed to reach the
result) and a form of cooperation that favours active teaching and social motivations
to copy. The afore-mentioned over-imitation studies, where people copy both
relevant and irrelevant actions demonstrated by others, provides evidence for this.
Another important factor that increases the fidelity of cultural transmission is the
use of epistemic tools (Sterelny 2006). Epistemic tools are modifications of the
environment—in a broad sense—that improve the cognitive capacities of
individuals. Tasks that are hard for children to learn, such as tying their shoes,
can be encoded in vivid images and rhymes such as ‘‘Bunny Ears’’. Tehrani and
Collard (2009) argue that they are able to trace robust phylogenies (a sign of
preservative transmission) of Iranian tribal textiles because craft learning is
scaffolded in such a way that different designs are embodied as a set of motor
routines that are difficult to rewire. Modern culinary recipes are another good
example of epistemic tools. They convey detailed information through numbered
lists of ingredients, with universal measures, explicit sequences of actions, and
possibly images of the various phases of the preparation. As with all technical
idioms, cookery language has developed a series of specific terms (to saute´, to
simmer, to reduce, etc.) that decrease ambiguity and, again, favour preservative
transmission.
Of course, language itself is a preeminent epistemic tool, and written language
has been explicitly considered as a technology that favours preservativity of cultural
transmission, compared to oral communication (Ong 1982; Rubin 1995). One
innovative line of studies examined the hand-copying by scribes of stories before
the invention of the printing press, stories such as The Canterbury Tales (Barbrook
et al. 1998; Howe et al. 2001). Phylogenetic analyses accurately reconstructed the
evolutionary relationships between the different manuscripts due to the high fidelity
copying. There were also copying errors intriguingly similar to those found in
genetic inheritance, such as the insertion or deletion of words or letters, or the
random swapping (or ‘crossing over’) of sentences from one manuscript to another.
In these cases, where the express goal is to replicate a text, there was seemingly very
little directional transformation.
Today, we can observe a new shift that involves digitally mediated cultural
interactions. The transmission of Internet content (think of social media ‘‘sharing’’)
is a form of highly preservative cultural transmission, where the information is
practically replicated with no mutation. Intriguingly, there are several examples of
short texts that have become ‘‘viral’’ in social networks such as Facebook or Twitter
which users are explicitly asked to not automatically share or re-tweet, but to copy
and paste manually (Adamic et al. 2014). This re-introduces the possibility of
transmission errors or conscious modifications, or, in other words, makes
transmission more reconstructive in a preservative media like the Internet. Adamic
et al. (2014) found indeed a decrease in transmission fidelity (a mutation rate of
11 %), with some non-random modifications. For example, the phrase ‘‘No one
should die because they can’t afford health insurance…’’ was transformed by
conservatives into ‘‘no one should die because the government is involved with
health care…’’, reminiscent of Bartlett’s (1932) early studies where information is
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distorted to fit pre-existing opinions. Overall, it is a fair question to ask whether the
ubiquitous presence of digital communication is making cultural transmission more
preservative than reconstructive and what the consequences are of this
transformation.
All these examples show that it is important to not automatically assume that
human culture is sustained by perfect transmission, but how, in some domains, the
fidelity of cultural transmission is higher than in others. Rather than deciding
whether attraction or selection is in general more important, it is more interesting to
ask the extent to which transmission is preservative or reconstructive in different
domains, and how attraction and selection consequently interact to shape cultural
variation.
Discussion
In this paper we examined a recent debate in the field of cultural evolution. Our
impression is that this debate is partly driven by confusion among the practitioners,
so we tried to clarify areas of genuine disagreement and of common ground, and,
especially, to elucidate how the issues have been, or could be, examined in
empirical studies. Our main message is that there is no insurmountable theoretical
disagreement between the standard cultural evolution approach and the cultural
attraction approach, but rather a focus on different aspects of cultural transmission
and evolution.
Specifically, we think that it is useful to distinguish between a broad definition of
the ‘‘attraction’’ concept (as described by Sperber 1996 and Claidie`re et al. 2014),
where attraction encompasses any directional process in cultural evolution, and a
narrow definition (more similar to the one modelled in Claidie`re and Sperber 2007),
where attraction is contrasted to selection, and relates specifically to transformative
and constructive processes in cultural transmission. While the broad concept of
attraction has the advantage of being more general (Claidie`re et al. 2014), it seems
to unnecessarily replace a series of concepts, such as direct and indirect biases,
which have already been formally and extensively modelled and in many cases have
strong empirical support. Moreover, generality is not necessarily better. For
example, as population geneticists can reasonably assume high-fidelity transmis-
sion, they have the advantage of being less general. The need for generality in
cultural evolution is not good per se, but should be associated with the relative
importance of transformative and constructive processes. Like others (e.g. El
Mouden et al. 2014), we see purely preservative and purely transformative
processes in cultural transmission as two extremes of a continuum, and therefore the
relative importance of selection and attraction in cultural evolution should be an
empirical problem, depending on the domain studied, on what one considers a
cultural trait to be, and, ultimately, on what level of explanation one is interested in.
A narrow definition of attraction usefully points to the importance of
transformative and constructive processes in cultural transmission, but, we argued,
there is no theoretical disagreement between the two approaches. Standard cultural
evolution models, from the very beginning, have contained transformative processes
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such as guided variation, that seem to us to be identical to narrow cultural attraction.
It might be argued that standard cultural evolution has focused more on modelling
preservative processes, and selection among traits, but it is unfair to characterise the
standard cultural evolution approach as having ignored transformative processes.
A focus on the differences between transformative and preservative processes in
cultural transmission suggests empirical studies that could be done to move forward
cultural evolution research. We noticed how, with rare exceptions (Eriksson and
Coultas 2014), virtually no studies in the cultural evolution tradition had directly
dealt with this challenge. In addition, in Eriksson and Coultas (2014), selection and
attraction worked in the same direction, both favouring stories eliciting an
emotional reaction of disgust. It would be informative to explicitly pit different
biases against each other and test their relative strength in a standard transmission
chain experiment (hence characterised by transformative transmission) versus a
simple task of choosing which story to pass on (preservative). One may hypothesise,
for example, that biases (or ‘‘factors of attraction’’) related to memorisation and
verbal reproduction would be more favoured in the transformative than in the
replicative condition, where perhaps contrasting biases related to ‘‘classic’’ cultural
selection (for example a prestige, or conformist, bias) could overcome the strength
of the former.
Additionally, while lab experiments are useful for showing what kind of biases
are possible, they cannot tell us which process is responsible for specific real-life
cases of cultural change. The analysis of real-life historical or cross-cultural datasets
is thus of primary importance for determining the relative role of attraction and
selection in cultural evolution. Morin (2013), for example, proposed that direct eye
gaze, as opposed to averted eye gaze, is a potent cultural attractor with respect to
portrait aesthetics, due to ‘‘our innate propensity to look at direct-gaze faces’’
(p.227). He showed that (1) direct gaze portraits are more likely to be reproduced in
art books, (2) direct gaze portraits increased in popularity over time, and (3)
individual painters did not modify their style over their lifetimes to prefer direct
gazes, instead the population-level change is driven by new generations of painters
who had stronger direct eye gaze preferences replacing earlier generations. He
therefore proposed that new apprentice painters either transform the style of their
teachers towards the direct eye gaze attractor (cultural attraction), or apprentices are
selectively exposed to the most popular paintings of the time, which were direct eye
gaze paintings, or selectively copy paintings that happened to have direct eye gaze
(cultural selection/biased transmission). Morin (2013) concludes that ‘‘a combina-
tion of cognitive attraction, cultural selection and demographic turn-over seems a
promising explanation’’ for the phenomena in question. More fine-grained,
individual-level data may be able to distinguish between these alternatives.
We briefly mentioned, at the end of Sect. 3.3, how present-day digital
interactions, besides representing an extraordinary source of quantitative data to
study cultural evolution, provides an epistemic tool for highly preservative cultural
transmission. Accordingly, it might be interesting to analyse whether and how the
preservativity of such tools influences the strength of different biases, compared, for
example, to an analogous orally transmitted tradition. More generally, the
availability of large amounts of quantitative data in digital form could be used to
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estimate precisely the degree of transmission fidelity (as in Adamic et al. 2014) and
to compare it in different areas, giving some indication of where to place different
cultural domains along the preservative/transformative continuum. Phylogenetic
methods are also being brought to bear on this issue with increasingly detailed
historical quantitative data being used to determine the transmission fidelity of
different folk tales (Tehrani 2013) and words (Pagel et al. 2007), for example.
In conclusion, we think that an interest in different aspects of cultural
transmission and evolution, far from representing a deadlock for cultural evolution
studies, can inspire new empirical studies and draw attention to details of
transmission not yet explored. We hope that this paper has gone some way to
clarifying potential points of confusion, and highlighted the extent of genuine
agreement on the key issues.
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